“The need for multiple scenario planning.” Covid-19 inquiry – Module 2 – emergency decision making

Baroness Hallett has recently published two reports (Vol 1 and Vol 2) on emergency decision-making across the four UK governments during the Covid-19 pandemic. This follows on from Module 1 which we reported on in two previous posts (UK Covid-19 Inquiry – Report on Module 1 and UK Covid-19 Inquiry – Report on Module 1). Her report highlights the need for multiple scenario planning: which should be up-to-date and adaptable. In this blog, we describe the reports outcomes as they relate to foresight – because it is clear that foresight work was insufficient, out-of-date and inadequately understood – and communicated.

These are all areas we come up against in our practice, and so this report is of real interest to us – as well as being of real value to governments worldwide.

Module 1, which covered the resilience and preparedness of the United Kingdom, concluded that “the UK lacked resilience and was ill-prepared for dealing with a catastrophic emergency”.

Much of the press reporting on the conclusions in Module 2 centred on Baroness Hackett’s comment that “there was a toxic and chaotic culture at the heart of the UK government” and that “This kind of culture is detrimental to good decision making.” But if we put personalities aside, what lessons are there to learn for other organisations facing emergency situations?

The Baroness acknowledged that “politicians and administrators … were presented with unenviable choices. Whatever decision they took, there was often no right answer or good outcome. They also had to make decisions in conditions of extreme pressure and initially without access to data or a full understanding of the … position.” These are circumstances many of us could face.

However, she adds: “Nonetheless, ….  the response [w]as too little, too late.” “February 2020 was a lost month.”

This leads to a first general conclusion: “The obviously escalating crisis required leadership from the very top.” Acting quickly and decisively” is a key recommendation. To avoid devastating consequences, leaders must “take timely and decisive action….The four governments of the UK did not.”

In my view, there was also a failure to understand that the spread of the disease would be “exponential”.  This does not just mean “fast”. It means ever-multiplying and that decisions deferred would mean more difficult decisions later.

Over-optimism was also a factor: “It is likely that Mr Johnson, acting in accordance with his own optimistic disposition, was content to accept the assurances of others, in particular those of Mr Hancock, that all reasonable precautions were being taken. The Inquiry saw no evidence that Mr Johnson challenged the assurances that he was receiving.” The PM admitted: “It is clear that we were far too complacent about what might happen, and about the state of our national preparedness.”

The approach to scenarios will interest futurists. There was in place a “Reasonable Worst Case Scenario”, which was very dramatic, envisaging 80% of the population becoming infected, although with a different type of virus with somewhat different characteristics.

One of the first recommendations in the report is for “the need for multiple scenario planning”. This would address the problem that “[the plan] was outdated and lacked adaptability.”  

“Ministers failed to grasp the distinction between model-based forecasts and scenario modelling.”  Scenarios were often wrongly treated as forecasts. Professor Whitty recalled that they “were not meant to be predictions, they were not presented as predictions, but they were often interpreted as predictions”. Modellers were then: “heavily criticised in the press and by some politicians when reality did not match these ‘predictions’, with the resulting reputational damage that this entailed”.

Failings in the use of scenarios extended to the Treasury (HMT). Dominic Cummings said that “At no point when I was there did HMT produce models of the economy in different scenarios”.

Professor Chris Whitty (then Chief Medical Officer) explained that only two of four potential scenarios were “probably worth considering for planning at this point”. One was a major outbreak in China that was brought under control, with any cases seeded in other countries, including the UK, not leading to “sustained onward transmission”. The other “opposite end of the risk scale” was that the virus could, within the next few weeks, “become widespread and turn into a significant pandemic relatively quickly”. He said that this was the “reasonable worst case scenario for which plans are also being developed”. He noted: “[T]he economic consequences of over-calling can be substantial, but the mortality and social consequences of under-calling are even more substantial.”

Professor Whitty acknowledged that the reasonable worst-case scenario is a “slippery concept”. It was insufficiently clear. As he explained, efforts to communicate its meaning to “people who are not used to it” can cause considerable confusion, because “they will say: well, how likely is that? To which the answer is: extraordinarily unlikely, and then everyone relaxes.”

A global pandemic has been high on the UK Government National Risk Register for many years – and still is. But the next pandemic could be very different from Covid-19 or influenza (modelled in the RWC scenario), with key differences in how and how quickly the virus is transmitted and the severity of illness it causes.

The Report recommends multiple scenarios analysed both separately and in combination. “No plan entirely survives contact with reality, but the more scenarios that are considered and the more responses tested, the greater the likelihood that those making difficult – even impossible – choices will be better placed to react quickly and decisively.”

Trigger points and Monitoring

A key element of good scenario planning is the identification of trigger points backed up by a good monitoring system. “Once the scientific community and the scientific advisers for each nation had become aware that the virus was causing substantially more cases of moderate or severe respiratory illness in China than was being officially reported, and that it had spread from China, the warning signs were there.” After an outbreak in Italy, emergency responses should have been triggered.

In SAMI we call a set of contingency plans developed for different scenarios, together with trigger points and monitoring, an “Adaptive Plan” – a way of making decisions now, but with flexibility to respond to changing circumstances.

Although, of course, many of the issues covered in the report are specific to a national pandemic, the implications for emergency planning in other organisations can be readily brought out.

Written by Huw Williams, SAMI Principal

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and not necessarily of SAMI Consulting.

Achieve more by understanding what the future may bring. We bring skills developed over thirty years of international and national projects to create actionable, transformative strategy. Futures, foresight and scenario planning to make robust decisions in uncertain times. Find out more at www.samiconsulting.co.uk.

If you enjoyed this blog from SAMI Consulting, the home of scenario planning, please sign up for our monthly newsletter at newreader@samiconsulting.co.uk and/or browse our website at https://www.samiconsulting.co.uk

Image by Pink Jellybeans from Pixabay